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Searching for Deep Disagreement in Logic: 
The Case of Dialetheism 
 




According to Fogelin’s account of deep disagreements, disputes caused by a clash in framework 
propositions are necessarily rationally irresolvable. Fogelin’s thesis is a claim about real-life, 
and not purely hypothetical, arguments: there are such disagreements, and they are incapable 
of rational resolution. Surprisingly then, few attempts have been made to find such disputes in 
order to test Fogelin’s thesis. This paper aims to rectify that failure. Firstly, it clarifies Fogelin’s 
concept of deep disagreement and shows there are several different breeds of such 
disagreements. Thus, to fully assess Fogelin’s thesis, it will be necessary to seek out cases of 
each breed to evaluate their rational irresolvability. Secondly, it begins this task by looking at 
a significant debate within the logical literature over the truth of contradictions. We demonstrate 
that, while the debate exemplifies a breed of deep disagreement, the parties involved can supply 
one another with rationally compelling reasons. 
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1 Introduction: Deep Disagreement and Logic 
 
There are deep disagreements, and they are immune to rational resolution. These are the two 
main claims of Fogelin’s “The Logic of Deep Disagreement”: 
 
Deep Disagreement: There exist deep disagreements. 
 
Rational Resistance: All deep disagreements are rationally irresolvable. 
 
Neither thesis entails the other. One could admit that while there exist deep disagreements, at 
least some of them are capable of rational resolution, thereby accepting Deep Disagreement 
while rejecting Rational Resistance. Inversely, one could deny there are any deep disagreements 
while admitting that if there were any then indeed they would be rationally irresolvable. Both 
theses, then, require independent justification. 
Given that Fogelin endorses both, we are faced with answering two questions: 
 
• Are there any deep disagreements? 
• Are these disagreements always immune to rational resolution? 
 
Fogelin’s thesis is not intended as a conceptual truth about the rational immunity of a purely 
hypothetical breed of argument. Rather, his claim is that certain real-world disagreements, such 
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as the well-known debates over abortion and positive discrimination, are immune to rational 
resolution due to their nature. Fogelin (1985, p. 5) is concerned that logic is in danger of missing 
the nuance of “genuine arguments that are complex and pressing,” which requires recognising 
those which, for principled reasons, somehow inoculate themselves from rational solutions. 
Consequently, to substantiate Fogelin’s thesis, it won’t be enough to demonstrate that deep 
disagreements would be rationally unresolvable if any were to exist. We must look to real-life 
arguments for plausible candidates of deep disagreements to support or undermine Fogelin’s 
thesis. 
Given this, it’s somewhat surprising that although significant time has been spent 
evaluating Rational Resistance in the abstract (Feldman 2005, Godden and Brenner 2010), little 
attention has been paid to how argumentation within plausible real-life cases of deep 
disagreement is conducted and evolves, and ultimately whether the parties involved can supply 
each other with rationally compelling reasons.1 This paper rectifies this failing, looking to a 
real-life dispute to consider whether Fogelin’s claims reflect argumentative practice. 
To do so, we look to an area of inquiry we would expect to be prone to such disagreements, 
logic. Much of our other knowledge requires us to presuppose that we possess certain logical 
knowledge or abilities. Consequently, it wouldn’t be surprising if we were to find that there 
existed disagreements between competing schools of logic immune to rational resolution due 
to reaching the ‘epistemic bedrock’. 
Particularly, we look to one of the more sustained debates within modern logic between 
dialetheism and classical logic over the truth of contradictions. Given the historical importance 
that the presumption that contradictions cannot be true has played within philosophy, this seems 
a suitable choice. If we should expect a rationally irresolvable debate within the academic 
literature, this would be it. 
The paper runs as follows. Section 2 clarifies Fogelin’s theses, and shows that his own 
discussion allows for several different breeds of deep disagreement, which are suitably 
delineated. Section 3 explains why logical disputes should be fertile grounds for deep 
disagreements. Section 4 outlines the dialetheism debate and explains how it exemplifies one 
breed of deep disagreement, and section 5 shows that despite this both parties are still able to 
provide one another with rationally compelling reasons. 
 
 
2 What is Deep Disagreement? 
 
Imagine we are old friends reminiscing about our misspent youth attending baseball games. As 
is bound to happen the Cubs come up in conversation, and I mention off-hand that they won 
the World Series last season (2016-17). You stare at me in disbelief, shaking your head. You 
haven’t been following the sport recently, you admit, but the Cubs have been dreadful for a 
long time. I agree, they have been, but still insist they managed to break their 107-year drought. 
If you ask for evidence, in the modern world I can produce it through numerous sources: video 
of the event, news reports, and records. All, almost instantly, over the internet. It’s hard to deny 
it now, you admit, and accept the initially unbelievable truth. 
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This is a realistic, if banal, argumentative exchange in which the parties initially disagree 
over the truth of a proposition regarding a sports team’s achievements, but generally agree over 
what would constitute evidence for and against the claim. Such exchanges are what Fogelin 
(1985, p. 3) refers to as normal arguments. There is a common argumentative environment of 
background assumptions among the parties within which reasons can be shared and recognised. 
In contrast to these normal arguments are cases where there is a lack of shared 
commitments, and particularly a clash between important framework propositions. It is in just 
these cases that we have deep disagreement. What, though, are these framework propositions? 
Here, unfortunately, the matter isn’t clear. Fogelin gives us very little, referring to the work 
of Putnam and Wittgenstein in describing them (Fogelin 1985, p. 5). We are told they provide 
the “structure within which reasons can be marshalled, where marshalling reasons is typically 
a matter of citing facts that others already know or of arranging facts in a way that their 
significance becomes clear,” (Fogelin 1985, p. 3). Yet, this description leaves important 
questions unanswered. For example, is accepting these propositions a precondition for 
providing any kind of reasons whatsoever? If so, are these propositions rationally indefeasible? 
Additionally, if such propositions are preconditions for providing reasons, is there just one 
adequate set of these propositions, or are there several equally enabling sets? We require 
answers to these questions, and Fogelin does not explicitly provide them. In our quest for 
answers we can begin by looking to one of the authors Fogelin cites as a source, Wittgenstein. 
In his own description of these epistemically important propositions, Wittgenstein prefers 
the analogy of a hinge:2  
 
The questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some 
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which we turn. 
That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain 
things are indeed not doubted… We just can’t investigate everything, and for that 
reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, 
the hinges must stay put. 
(Wittgenstein 1975, §§341-3; cf. §115, §337) 
 
Two properties of these “hinge” propositions are immediately apparent. Firstly, they are 
required to investigate the truth of other claims and, secondly, they are exempt from doubt. The 
process of providing reasons for our beliefs presupposes the existence of certain propositions 
“[lying] apart from the route travelled by inquiry” (Wittgenstein 1975, §88). It is these 
propositions that provide the “inherited background against which [we] distinguish between 
[what is] true and false” (Wittgenstein 1975, §94), and thus must be exempt from doubt if they 
are to serve this role. 
Note that nothing said so far demonstrates that a proposition p which is a “hinge” for some 
individual I must be a “hinge” for everyone; p may very well be a “hinge” proposition for I 
while failing to be for some other individual I´.3 Nor does the fact that p is exempt from doubt 
for some individual I, because p is a “hinge” for I, entail that p is essentially rationally 
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indefeasible. It may simply be that in order for p to be rationally defeasible for I, p must lose 
its important epistemic status as a “hinge” for I. 
Thus, even if we take Fogelin’s claim seriously, and treat Wittgenstein’s “hinges” as a 
progenitor of framework propositions, there are still two important questions left unanswered:4 
 
i) Must all individuals endorse the same framework propositions? 
ii) Are framework propositions by definition rationally indefeasible? 
 
To answer these questions, we must look at how framework propositions fit into Fogelin’s 
justification for Rational Resistance, that deep disagreements are beyond rational resolution. 
Fogelin’s argument is grounded in two claims. Firstly, deep disagreements are defined as 
those in which there is a “clash in underlying principles” (Fogelin 1985, p. 5), the 
aforementioned framework propositions. Secondly, a shared background of these propositions 
is a necessary condition for rational argumentation. Combined, these claims demonstrate that 
the nature of deep disagreements preclude rational resolution. Unlike normal argumentative 
exchanges, in which there exist “shared procedures for resolving disagreement,” (Fogelin 1985, 
p. 3), the lack of these shared commitments in deep disagreements precludes rational 
resolution. 
While deep disagreements may look like arguments, smell like arguments, they are no 
such thing, for “the conditions for argument do not exist”. While the “language of argument 
may persist…it becomes pointless since it makes an appeal to something that does not exist; a 
shared background of beliefs,” (Fogelin 1985, p. 5). It isn’t then that the parties are unable to 
reach a rational resolution because they are pig-headed or acting in bad faith. Deep 
disagreements, we are told, simply fail to possess the properties necessary for argumentation 
to exist. On every occasion in which one side of the debate proposes a reason to advance their 
conclusion, the other side will fail to recognise the force of the reason, as such force relies upon 
unshared assumptions. 
At this stage, some clarification is required. On occasion, as in the quote above, Fogelin 
speaks as though the parties in a deep disagreement share no “background of beliefs”. Yet, it’s 
clear that Fogelin does not, and cannot, set the bar for deep disagreements this high. If the 
requirement was that there is no intersection between parties’ beliefs then deep disagreements 
would be disagreements by name only. In order to disagree, parties must hold inconsistent sets 
of propositions, whether in the form of contradictory propositions, or sets of propositions that 
entail contradictory propositions. Yet, holding inconsistent propositions requires parties at 
minimum to share certain beliefs regarding the objects being referred to, and the putative 
properties of those objects under dispute. Otherwise we simply have parties talking past one 
another. That this can happen is without doubt, yet this is not supposed to be the case within 
deep disagreements. These are disagreements, just disagreements of a special kind. Deep 
disagreements, therefore, do not require the parties to have disjoint belief sets. 
                                                 
4 While Fogelin’s discussion was undoubtedly inspired by Wittgenstein’s talk of “hinges”, there are 
significant complications facing anyone attempting to identify Wittgenstein’s “hinges” with Fogelin’s 
framework propositions, such as Wittgenstein (1975, §110 and §204) ultimately talking in terms of 
acting, rather than accepting fundamental propositions. Unfortunately, a consideration of these 
complications is beyond this paper’s scope. See Godden and Brenner (2010) for a detailed discussion 
of Fogelin’s thesis in light of Wittgenstein’s claims in On Certainty. 
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Further, as Fogelin makes clear elsewhere, nor do the parties need to disagree on every 
proposition relevant to the debate. When discussing the case of abortion, he states that one of 
the features of deep disagreements is that they persist even though there is agreement on many 
relevant claims: 
 
Parties on opposite sides of the abortion debate can agree on a wide range of 
biological facts…yet continue to disagree on the moral issue. Their disagreement 
can even survive a general agreement on moral issues: for example, on the sanctity 
of human life. (Fogelin 1985, p. 5) 
 
So, when Fogelin speaks of deep disagreements arising due to a lack of a “shared background 
of beliefs”, he is being too casual. Rather, his point is that there are a certain set of privileged 
propositions, framework propositions, such that a lack of shared commitment to these ensures 
parties are unable to effectively marshal reasons against each other’s positions. 
Clarity over Fogelin’s argument for Rational Resistance goes a significant way to 
answering our questions over framework propositions. Firstly, it’s clear that not every 
individual is required to believe the same set of framework propositions. After all, if everyone 
were required to believe the same set of framework propositions in order to instigate the reason-
giving game, this would flat out preclude the “clash of framework propositions” (Fogelin 1985, 
p. 5) required for deep disagreements. Consequently, we must insist there is no single set of 
propositions everyone must hold. Rather, there are numerous available sets. This highlights 
that, as different individuals can possess different framework propositions, so particular 
propositions can gain or lose their privileged status of being a framework proposition within 
an individual’s belief set. What is in doubt is how that can happen—whether these framework 
propositions can be disregarded and changed on the basis of rational means or not. 
Secondly, Fogelin’s argument for Rational Resistance provides us with strong reasons to 
think that framework propositions are not by definition rationally indefeasible. By proposing 
that deep disagreements are rationally unresolvable, Fogelin is claiming that two positions 
premised on inconsistent framework propositions are immune to rational resolution. Yet, if by 
definition framework propositions were not up for rational debate, then Rational Resistance 
would be true by definition. Simply in virtue of being rationally indefeasible propositions, 
debates grounded on framework propositions would be rationally irresolvable, as a rational 
resolution of the debate would require one of these disputed framework propositions to be 
rationally defeated. Yet, as mentioned earlier, Rational Resistance has been fruitfully debated 
within the literature, a possibility which would be precluded by defining framework 
propositions as rationally indefeasible. Of course, this does not preclude the possibility that 
framework propositions turn out to be rationally indefeasible, but such a conclusion should be 
the result of substantial philosophical work, rather than stipulation. We should not then 
integrate rational indefeasibility into Fogelin’s definition of framework propositions. 
The same conclusion is suggested by textual evidence. While Fogelin (1985, p. 3) claims 
that framework propositions are used to marshal reasons, supporting non-framework 
propositions, nowhere does he suppose these propositions are by definition rationally 
indefeasible. The important question for Fogelin is not whether these framework propositions 
are by definition rationally indefeasible, but whether disagreements due to a clash in these 
justificatory and structurally important beliefs can be resolved by rational means. 
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We now have a good grasp of what deep disagreements are, Fogelin’s argument for 
Rational Resistance, and the special features of framework propositions. Before we move on 
to evaluating Fogelin’s theses, however, two further matters require clarification. 
Firstly, Fogelin speaks of deep disagreements being incapable of rational resolution. What 
does he mean exactly? Firstly, Fogelin certainly does not mean that there are practical barriers 
to rationally resolving the debates, whether this be due to boredom, fatigue, a lack of money, 
relevant evidence, or even ingenuity. This disagreement should persist even when the 
participants have inexhaustible patience, energy and resources. The rational irresolvability is 
due, instead, to the intrinsic and structural properties of the debate—that there is a “clash” of 
framework propositions. Similarly, Fogelin does not simply mean that the parties involved will 
never reach an agreement on the matter through rational means. After all, it is possible that a 
dispute between competing scientific research programmes fails to be resolved, even though 
both sides recognise the strengths and weaknesses of each other’s programmes. They may 
simply each have extremely high threshold levels for giving up their own programmes (and 
research money!). Instead, Fogelin means something stronger. It is “not the weak claim that in 
such contexts arguments cannot be settled. It is the stronger claim that the conditions for 
argument do not exist,” (Fogelin 1985, pp. 4-5). Thus, to say that the disagreements are 
incapable of rational resolution means that no party within the debate could provide another 
with rationally compelling reasons to either reject their own position, or accept their 
opponent’s. As we shall see below in section 5, this demonstrates that in order to challenge 
Rational Resistance we are not under an obligation to outline the conditions under which a 
deep disagreement would be rationally resolved. Instead, we only need show that the relevant 
parties are able to provide one another with rationally compelling reasons.5 
What are rationally compelling reasons, exactly? They are reasons that require us to 
recognise a relative weakness in our own position, or a strength in another’s position. It is 
exactly these reasons which exist in normal argumentative settings, whether between 
researchers or friends. Nothing about the existence of these reasons ensures that one side will 
concede, or be ‘rationally forced’ to concede. Indeed, it is hard to know what ‘being rationally 
forced’ could mean. Yet, as noted above, Fogelin does not require that we outline the conditions 
under which one would be rationally forced to “settle” the debate, but instead that the 
conditions for argument, the giving and recognising of reasons, exist.6 
Secondly, we must clarify what Fogelin (1985, p. 5) means by a “clash” of framework 
propositions in his depiction of deep disagreements. There are two subtleties here. Firstly, it’s 
unclear from Fogelin’s discussion whether a clash requires the parties to hold contradictory 
framework propositions, such that one party I must hold some proposition p, which is a 
framework proposition for I, and the other party I´ holds ¬p, which is a framework proposition 
for them. To use Fogelin’s abortion case, this would require a pro-life advocate to hold some 
proposition p, say that “Foetuses are people with a right to life” as a framework proposition, 
and the pro-choice camp to hold the contradictory, “Foetuses are not people with a right to 
life”, also as a framework proposition. Call this a strong clash of framework propositions. 
                                                 
5 I thank an anonymous referee for pushing me on this point. 
6 Indeed, if we were so required to sketch out the conditions under which one party would be rationally 
required to accept their opponent’s position, then not only would the target deep disagreements fail the 
test of rational resolvability, but so would most (if not all) complex debates between research 
programmes. 
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This is not the only way to interpret “clash”. There are two further possibilities. Firstly, 
one party holds some proposition p as a framework proposition, while the disagreeing party 
believes ¬p, but does not treat it as a framework proposition. Instead, it could be a consequence 
of other framework propositions and auxiliary claims. Within the abortion debate, this would 
be the pro-choice advocate, rather than endorsing “Foetuses are not people with a right to life” 
as a framework proposition, accepting the proposition as a consequence of the framework 
proposition “Only entities with a functioning cerebral cortex are people” and certain empirical 
findings. Call this a weak clash of framework propositions. 
Lastly, there is the possibility of a distant clash of framework propositions. This is where 
the target propositions under dispute, p and ¬p, are framework propositions for neither party, 
but are supported by the parties’ respective framework propositions (in combination with 
auxiliary propositions). Within the abortion debate, this would be the parties disagreeing over 
“Foetuses are people with a right to life” but neither party treating this or its negation as a 
framework proposition. Rather, say, the pro-life advocate could be treating “Every Church 
teaching is true” as a framework proposition, and the pro-choice advocate treating “Only 
entities with a functioning cerebral cortex are people” as a framework proposition.7 
As using Fogelin’s own example of the abortion debate to describe these types of clash 
makes clear, each is a viable interpretation of the notion, and thus suitable for study.8 Nor 
should we assume that weak or distant clashes will be any less troublesome than strong clashes. 
The second subtlety here is the extent of the disagreement over framework propositions. 
By this we mean whether the relevant parties share some framework propositions or none. Call 
a clash complete when the two parties fail to share any framework propositions, and partial if 
they disagree over certain framework propositions, but share others. 
As with our interpretation of the type of clash, it may seem obvious that it is complete 
clashes which constitute real and proper deep disagreements. After all, as above, Fogelin talks 
of deep disagreements being due to a lack of shared background beliefs. We should resist the 
temptation, however, to associate deep disagreements solely with complete clashes for two 
reasons. Firstly, Fogelin admits with his own example of the abortion debate that the two parties 
can agree on important moral principles, such as the sanctity of life. We could go further and 
say that both sides of the debate are often committed to other important propositions, such as 
“There is a moral distinction between persons and inanimate objects” and “If foetuses are 
persons, then they have a right to life”. It would seem presumptive to assume that, in virtue of 
the parties sharing belief in these proposition, they cannot be framework propositions. They 
hold the same weighty epistemic status Fogelin (1985, p. 5) gives to propositions such as 
“Persons are entities with immortal souls”. 
Secondly, and even more importantly, given that Fogelin commits himself to the existence 
of these deep disagreements, we shouldn’t preclude talk of partial clashes until we have looked 
at real-life cases, as this form of clash may be the best Fogelin can hope for. Yes, it may be that 
disagreements which are complete are more likely to be immune to rational resolution, and thus 
make Rational Resolution true. But, at the same time, we may be unable to find any cases of 
                                                 
7 Note that, on the assumption that the parties agree on the truth of the auxiliary propositions, a distant 
clash can always be transformed into a weak clash by making one of the framework propositions the 
target proposition under dispute. In reality, of course, this does not always happen. 
8 Indeed, while at first sight it may seem obvious that strong clashes are the proper cases of deep 
disagreement that Fogelin had in mind, once we take Fogelin’s own example of the abortion debate 
seriously this type of clash seems the least relevant! 
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such severe disagreements, thus putting the truth of Deep Disagreement into doubt. In 
advocating both theses, Fogelin must walk the fine line of providing an account of deep 
disagreements which are severe enough in their clashes to make Rational Resistance true, but 
realistic enough so as to make Deep Disagreement true. Further, as we shall see with our case 
study, it is easy, before great argumentative effort and ingenuity is given over a dispute, to 
assume that a disagreement is complete, rather than partial. Consequently, we should not at 
this stage take either complete or partial clashes off the table. Both are suitable for study—it 
may turn out that partial clashes are the best Fogelin can hope for.9 
In providing this clarification to Fogelin’s notion of clash, six distinct breeds of deep 
disagreement emerge, in accordance with this schema: 
 
DD: Disagreements over some set of propositions  that involve a 
strong/weak/distant and complete/partial clash in framework propositions. 
 
Let the following acronyms serve to denote each breed: 
 
Breed of DD Complete Partial 
Strong DD-StC DD-StP 
Weak DD-WkC DD-WkP 
Distant DD-DsC DD-DsP 
 
This categorisation of deep disagreements should provide the necessary framework in which 
to discuss the truth of both Rational Resistance and Deep Disagreement. An important future 
task for the literature is to find examples of real-life arguments fitting each characterisation, 
thus verifying Deep Disagreement for that breed of DD, and enquiring whether these 
disagreements are indeed immune to rational resolution or not, testing Rational Resistance for 
each breed. Verifying the joint truth of Deep Disagreement and Rational Resistance, therefore, 
now becomes the more nuanced matter of verifying them relative to a breed of DD. 
This paper begins that project by looking at a disagreement within logic, over the truth of 
contradictions. As we shall argue, the disagreement appears to be a DD-WkP in which both 
sides are able to provide rationally compelling reasons—at least some breeds of deep 
disagreement are rationally resolvable. 
 
 
3 Logic, A Fertile Ground for Deep Disagreement 
 
In searching for deep disagreements, logic should be the most fertile ground, due to two 
interrelated reasons. Firstly, logic is fundamental to many of our claims to further knowledge. 
We use logic to reason about scientific hypotheses, produce mathematical proofs, and engage 
in argumentation. Consequently, the use of logic is all pervasive, and necessary in order to 
construct reasons for other non-logical propositions. Secondly, because much of our 
knowledge presupposes the use of logic, it’s unclear how we can use evidence from these other 
domains to either support or undermine logical beliefs. In other words, when there is a logical 
                                                 
9 For precedent that we ought to treat partial clashes as constituting deep disagreements, see Davson-
Galle (1992). 
 9 
disagreement, there is nothing to fall back upon to act as evidence to resolve the disagreement. 
Thus, logical propositions seem prima facie excellent cases of framework propositions––their 
truth never (or, rarely) enters into conversation, and logical rules of inference are necessary in 
order to “provide the framework or the structure within which reasons can be marshalled” 
(Fogelin 1985, p. 3). 
Further evidence of the special epistemic role that logical propositions are thought to play 
is provided by the two most historically prominent accounts of logical knowledge, logical 
rationalism and semanticism. According to these accounts, logical knowledge is either a direct 
result of intuition or definitions, respectively. Consequently, if one disagrees over the truth of 
a fundamental matter of logic, one just doesn’t see what is obvious (BonJour 1998), or one has 
misunderstood the definition (Carnap 1937). In such cases there is little that can be done to 
reconcile these differences other than to further educate one’s interlocutor in the hope they 
have the right kind of intuition, or appropriately understand what the logical terms mean. If the 
interlocutor still doesn’t accept the proposition at hand then either they are refusing to accept 
the obvious, or playing a different game. 
Logic, then, would seem fertile ground for deep disagreement, with its plausible candidates 
for framework propositions. By looking at logical disputes we can hope to find examples of 
deep disagreement, providing us with a means to test Fogelin’s theses. Obviously, a detailed 
consideration of multiple logical disagreements is beyond this paper’s scope, and so we will 
need to pick our case. Here we consider one of the most substantial challenges to modern 
logical orthodoxy, dialetheism. Given the extent to which dialetheism recommends a revision 
of some of our most treasured logical principles, the debate would seem an excellent starting 
point in the search for a deep disagreement, and thus a means to test their rational resolvability. 
 
 
4 The Dialetheism Debate 
 
The law of non-contradiction (LNC) has held an exalted status throughout the history of both 
philosophy and the sciences, with Aristotle calling it the “most certain of all principles” (1924, 
1005b18). So certain has the principle been that few arguments throughout the history of 
philosophy have been given for it. Indeed, on the rare occasion that arguments have been 
proposed for the principle, such as Aristotle’s famous defence in the Metaphysics, the 
arguments end up only supporting the law by presupposing some version of it (Priest 2006b, 
Ch. 1). This perhaps would not be surprising to Aristotle, as he suggested that knowing the 
principle is a precondition for knowing anything (1924, 1005b17). 
That no contradiction can be true is a given for most philosophers is suggested not only by 
the fact that definitions of ‘contradiction’ regularly offer contradictions as simply necessarily 
false propositions (Cook 2009, p. 68), but by the fact that the principle clearly plays a 
fundamental structural role in the reason-giving game. A few examples here will suffice. 
Firstly, when scientists persistently collect data which contradicts the predictions of a theory, 
unless the troublesome findings can be otherwise explained away, this is considered to be a 
problem for the theory because contradictions cannot be true. Secondly, contradictions serve 
as the ultimate error message, black mark, of a theory—a result that we cannot accept in any 
sense (Rumfitt 2010, p. 36). It is for exactly this reason that reductios, the most powerful 
argumentative tool philosophers and mathematicians have at their disposal, are valid. Once one 
has shown that a proposition, potentially in combination with background assumptions, entails 
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a contradiction, this is enough in and of itself to conclude that the proposition is false. Thirdly, 
in combination with the meaning of the Boolean connectives, it is the falsity of contradictions 
which supports inferences as fundamental as modus tollens ({A → B, ¬B} ⊨ ¬A) and the 
disjunctive syllogism ({A  B, ¬A} ⊨ B). If contradictions can be true, then these rules of 
inference need not be valid, as we shall see below. 
Consequently, for the classical logician (and many working scientists) the proposition that 
“No contradictions are true” seems a paradigm example of what Fogelin means by a framework 
proposition. It provides the very mechanism through which we can demonstrate the falsity of 
theories, both using reductio and empirical evidence, and is so fundamental to the reason-
giving game that on those rare occasions arguments have been provided for the principle, one 
simply ends up presupposing it at some point. In sum, we have a framework proposition for a 
significant group of working philosophers, mathematicians, and scientists. 
However, despite this famous principle holding the status of a framework proposition for 
many, it has recently come under a sustained attack from dialetheism, the theory that some 
contradictions are true (Priest 2006a, p. 1). While there may have been past advocates of 
dialetheism, motivated by matters such as the concept of motion and change (see Priest 1995), 
it was with the modern dialetheic solutions to the self-referential logico-semantic paradoxes 
(Priest 2006b) that dialetheism found its most persistent and successful motivation. In what 
follows, we will be interested particularly in the debate between classical logicians and those 
contemporary dialetheists motivated solely by such paradoxes (e.g., Beall 2009).10 
According to dialetheists, these paradoxes have evaded successful non-dialetheic solutions 
not because of a lack of effort or rigour on the logician’s part, but due to an inherent flaw that 
all non-dialetheic solutions share (Priest 2006b, Ch. 1-2). Take for example the most famous 
of these paradoxes, the liar sentences, of which the Strengthened Liar is one example: 
 
() ⌐¬ is not true. 
 
In his formal analysis of the concept of truth, Tarski (1944) provided reasons to believe that 
any language L in which, 
 
i) Any sentence s in L can be named by a term t belonging to L, and 
ii) L’s own semantics can be expressed within the language (e.g., that sentence 
s is true), 
 
can produce a liar sentence. These two conditions are known as the semantic closure of a 
language. Additionally, Tarski showed that through endorsing the intuitively plausible 
unrestricted T-schema, 
 
T(⌐A¬)  A 
 
                                                 
10 Of course, dialetheists and classical logicians are not the only parties involved in the debate over the 
self-referential paradoxes—gappy logicians disagree with both. However, this isn’t a concern for us 
here. The debate between dialetheists and classical logicians itself constitutes a disagreement, and thus 
is sufficient to test Fogelin’s Rational Resistance. But, we are confident that what we have to say about 
this debate is transferrable to the wider debate including other non-classical logicians. 
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and some uncontroversial logical rules, it can be shown that any such language L is 
inconsistent: 
 
  ¬T(⌐¬)    (L1–Strengthened Liar) 
T(⌐¬)      (L2–Instance of T-Schema ) 
T(⌐¬)  ¬T(⌐¬)   (L3–From L1-L2 by transitivity) 
T(⌐¬)  ¬T(⌐¬)   (L4–Instance of LEM) 
T(⌐¬)  ¬T(⌐¬)   (L5–From L3-L4 by cases and adjunction) 
 
The result is obviously incompatible with fundamental tenets of classical logic. Firstly, 
contrary to the LNC, some contradictions are true, and secondly, some propositions are both 
true and false.11 Thus, either classical logic must be revised, restrictions must be placed upon 
languages’ semantic closure, or the T-schema must be restricted. Tarksi’s (1956) own 
suggestion was to restrict semantic closure through a hierarchy of languages. The dialetheist, 
however, argues that restricting languages’ semantic closure or the T-schema will be ultimately 
unsuccessful. Either because these solutions are incomplete, by allowing revenge versions of 
the paradox to arise, unnecessarily limit the expressibility of languages, distorting the meaning 
of perfectly acceptable natural-language sentences, or provide ad hoc fixes to a substantial 
philosophical problem (Priest 2006b, Ch. 1). Instead, we ought to bite the bullet and accept the 
conclusion of the paradox—there are true contradictions, and so one must reject classical logic. 
The dialetheist not only rejects classical logic, however, by admitting certain 
contradictions as true. They must endorse a different logic, one appropriate to their own 
commitments. These logics have three essential properties (Martin 2018), being: 
 
Dialetheic: A logic L is dialetheic iff L permits contradictions, formally conceived as 
formulae of the form A  ¬A, to be true in an interpretation. 
 
Paraconsistent: A logic L is paraconsistent iff, for some formulae of the form A and 
B, {A, ¬A} ⊭L B. 
 
Strongly Paraconsistent: A logic L is strongly paraconsistent iff, for some formulae 
of the form A and B, {A  ¬A} ⊭L B.12 
 
Dialetheists require their logics to possess each of these properties in order to ensure true 
contradictions can be accommodated without trivialism, the thesis that every proposition is 
true, ensuing; a commitment most dialetheists wish to avoid (Priest 2004). 
Not all logics possessing one of these properties have the rest. For example, Jennings and 
Schotch’s (1984) preservationist logics are paraconsistent but neither strongly paraconsistent 
nor dialetheic. There are, however, some logics which possess all three properties, the most 
famous being Priest’s (2006b, Ch. 19) Logic of Paradox (LP). As with Dunn’s (1976) four-
                                                 
11 Given that untruth entails falsity in classical semantics: ¬T(⌐¬) → F(⌐¬). 
12 While these conditions constitute the core requirements of a dialetheist’s logic, they are not the only 
criteria used by dialetheists to evaluate a logic’s appropriateness. For example, dialetheists often wish 
for their logic to respect the normal semantics for the Boolean connectives. For this reason, Priest’s LP 
is preferred to da Costa’s (1974) Ci(1 ≤ i ≤ ) logics. See Martin (2018). 
 12 
valued semantics for First Degree Entailment, valuations in LP are conceived as relations  
from a propositional language ℒ to the set {1, 0}, but with the restriction that each member of 
ℒ takes at least one truth-value. Thus, propositional parameters may be assigned the truth-value 
true, false, or both true and false in an interpretation.13 The Boolean connectives are then given 
their normal semantics:14 
 
(A  B)1 iff A1 and B1 
(A  B)0 iff A0 or B0 
 
(A  B)1 iff A1 or B1 
(A  B)0 iff A0 and B0 
 
(A)1 iff A0 
(A)0 iff A1 
 
Combined with the usual definition of logical consequence in terms of truth-preservation, 
 
 ⊨LP B iff for all , if A1 for all A, then B1, 
 
LP possesses some interesting properties. Firstly, while it allows a contradiction A  ¬A to be 
true within a valuation (let A1 and A0), given the meaning of negation and conjunction 
above, every contradiction is also always false. That is, at most a contradiction is both true 
and false, never simply true. This means that the standard formulation of the LNC, ¬(A  ¬A), 
is a theorem of LP.15 Secondly, LP invalidates important classically valid inferences, 
including: 
 
• Explosion: {A, ¬A} ⊨ B 
• Modus ponens: {A, A → B} ⊨ B 
• The disjunctive syllogism: {A  B, ¬A} ⊨ B 
• Reductio ad absurdum: {B → (A  ¬A)} ⊨ ¬B16 
 
Consequently, dialetheists’ commitment to true contradictions, combined with the wish to hold 
certain other commitments, ensures they also disagree with classical logicians on a host of 
other matters, including whether some propositions are both true and false, and the validity of 
the rules of inference above. 
These considerations allow us to draw two initial conclusions. Firstly, according to the 
distinctions made in section 3, we have a weak clash of framework propositions here. A weak 
clash because the proposition that “No contradictions are true” is a framework proposition for 
                                                 
13 One can also provide a truth-functional semantics for LP, however there are good reasons for 
preferring a relational semantics; see Martin (2018). 
14 With the material conditional A → B defined in the usual way, A  B. 
15 In fact, LP has the same set of theorems as classical logic (Priest 2006b, p. 76). 
16 For countermodels to explosion, modus ponens and disjunctive syllogism let A1 and A0 but only 
B0, and for reductio let A1 and A0 but only B1. 
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the classical logician, but the dialetheist’s contradictory claim that some contradictions are true 
is not a framework proposition for them. Instead, they provide independent reasons to support 
it. Consequently, what we have here is either a DD-WkC or DD-WkP, depending on whether 
the divergence over framework propositions is complete or partial—a matter we shall come to. 
Secondly, by disagreeing with the classical logician over a framework proposition which 
plays such a fundamental role within the reason-giving game, the dialetheist has also thrown 
much else up in the air by invalidating within her logic important rules of inference. 
Consequently, we must expect considerable disagreement between the parties over how 
evidence can be marshalled in support of their conclusions. Particularly important is the 
parties’ disagreement over the validity of reductio. While, historically, one of the most 
powerful methods to refute a theory was to show that it entailed a contradiction, for the 
dialetheist demonstrating that a contradiction arises from their commitments will have no 
effect—“you have just brought another true contradiction to our attention,” they will say. 
Indeed, the dialetheist is under no rational obligation to renege on their commitments simply 
because one shows that a proposition they endorse contradicts their position. They can simply 
agree with you. 
With so much argumentative ground undercut, there is good reason to think the debate 
would support Fogelin’s theses. Both camps have found their own reflective equilibrium, but 
lack the means to rationally move the other. Such an impression is certainly supported by initial 
responses to dialetheism. Some suggested that dialetheists were simply guilty of mental 
confusions (Slater 2007), and others that dialetheism only seemed plausible because they had 
changed the meaning of ‘contradiction’ (Jennings and Schotch 2009, p. 31). Dialetheists are 
simply mistaken, either because they fail to see the obvious, that contradictions cannot be true, 
or fail to appreciate the correct definition of ‘contradiction’. Consequently, so the response 
goes, dialetheists are simply talking about a completely different subject to the classical 
logician when they maintain that contradictions are true—the parties are bound to talk at cross 
purposes, and ultimately come to an impasse. 
Further, the debate meets another of Fogelin’s (1985, p. 5) suspicions of deep 
disagreements, that both parties can agree on many matters of fact while still disagreeing on 
the substantive issue. For example, the dialetheist can agree that, because formulae of the form 
¬(A  ¬A) are theorems of their logic, once they admit one true contradiction an infinite number 
follow through adjunction, without being perturbed. 
As an expression of these concerns over the viability of the debate, no one has provided a 
clearer articulation than David Lewis in his reply to Priest and Beall’s invitation to contribute 
to a collection on the subject: 
 
I’m sorry; I decline to contribute to your proposed book about the ‘debate’ 
over the law of non-contradiction. My feeling is that since this debate 
instantly reaches deadlock, there’s nothing much to say about it. To conduct 
a debate, one needs common ground; principles in dispute cannot of course 
fairly be used as common ground; and in this case, the principles not in 
dispute are so very much less certain than non-contradiction itself. 
 
(Lewis 2004, p. 176) 
 
Even if there are some shared commitments left, none could compensate for such a monumental 
loss. Appearances, however, can be misleading. We will show that, although a deep 
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disagreement, both sides are able to supply the other with rationally compelling reasons. They 
are able to do this because, while the clash in framework principles is very real, it is also partial. 
Consequently, due to considerable argumentative ingenuity, the debate is able to make progress.  
 
 
5 Common Ground 
 
In this section we argue that the dialetheism-classical logic debate constituted of a weak clash 
of framework propositions is rationally resolvable. In order to demonstrate this, it will not be 
necessary to supply specific reasons that would be sufficient for a resolution. Theory choice 
within any area is never that simple. There is rarely, if ever, a crucial experiment. It would, 
therefore, be pure folly to attempt to specify the conditions under which the debate would be 
resolved. Rather, to meet the challenge set by Fogelin’s Rational Resistance, our task is to show 
that both sides in the debate can supply rationally compelling reasons to the other—that each 
side can give the other reasons for thinking their position is weaker than originally thought, or 
that their opponent’s is comparatively stronger. This we will show by arguing that both parties 
within the dialetheism debate can reframe the argument around fundamental rational values 
held by the other side (and sometimes shared). Indeed, if dialetheism were simply a rejection 
of the LNC, then the debate might be beyond rational resolution, or even comprehension. 
However, what is so compelling about the dialetheist’s argument is that they aim to demonstrate 
to the classical logician that their fundamental rational values are in tension with one another. 
The classical logician, in reply, aims to show that dialetheism does not deliver on its promises. 
To demonstrate how both sides are able to offer rationally compelling reasons, let us revisit the 
dialetheist’s argument based upon the liar. 
As far as the dialetheist is concerned, dialetheism provides the best available response to 
the philosophical problems raised by the liar paradox. Classical, along with other, solutions in 
contrast fail to provide an adequate and comprehensive solution. 
Dialetheists criticise other solutions to the liar on three scores. Firstly, they are incomplete, 
for although they may provide a solution to one of the liar paradoxes, out of this solution other 
revenge liars arise which cannot be solved by the same means. This is the dialetheist’s classic 
response to gappy solutions (Priest 2006b, pp. 12-16). While proposing truth-value gaps may 
solve, 
 
() ⌐¬ is false 
 
the same approach will not work for the Strengthened Liar, 
 
() ⌐¬ is not true. 
 
In virtue of being truth-value gappy, () is indeed not true, and thus what it says about itself is 
true. So, () turns out to be both gappy and true. 
Secondly, non-dialetheic solutions require us to unnecessarily restrict the meaningfulness 
of natural-language sentences—that is, unnecessarily restrict expressiveness. As liar sentences 
are a product of the semantic closure of languages and the unrestricted T-schema, a non-
dialetheic solution would require one to restrict the expressive power of natural-languages by 
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banning “the expressibility of certain key concepts [e.g. truth]…from the language,” (Priest 
2006b, p. 24). Yet, we are fully aware that the English sentences these solutions require us to 
deem meaningless are not, for they are the simple result of linguistic devices sanctioned by the 
language. In contrast, by not restricting semantic closure or the T-schema, the dialetheic 
solution respects languages’ expressibility. 
Lastly, the dialetheist criticises other solutions for being ad hoc, that is, not based upon 
principled reasons. It is “not in doubt that we can avoid paradoxes if we can make any move 
we like… [consequently, a putative solution to the liars] not backed up by an independent 
rationale is just an intellectual fraud,” (Priest 2006b, p. 14). Thus, making any move necessary 
to avoid the contradiction which follows from the liar sentences is simply to lack intellectual 
integrity. What we need, instead, is a principled and unifying solution to all of the liar 
paradoxes, and according to the dialetheist, this solution just is to admit their conclusions! 
In criticising other solutions using these three criteria, the dialetheist is both appealing to 
rational values held by others within the logical community, and taking on the rational 
obligation to demonstrate that her own solution fails to suffer from these faults or, at least, 
suffers from them to a lesser extent than others. 
Now, perhaps if the classical logician hesitated and suggested there was no need for logic 
to accommodate tricky cases like the liar, debate would stagnate and no compelling reasons 
could be given either way. However, we find no such hesitation. There is a general agreement 
that the liar is a paradoxical case that should be accommodated by one’s logic. This is 
demonstrated by the numerous attempts to resolve the paradox, whether this be Tarski’s own 
attempt to rescue classical logic by restricting semantic closure, or more contemporary attempts 
to show that non-dialetheic solutions are not susceptible to revenge liars (Murzi and Rossi 
2018). Not only this, but there is agreement in the non-dialetheic literature that solutions to the 
liar must be independently motivated, and not restrict the meaningfulness of natural-language 
sentences simply in order to save a logical theory.17 In other words, despite calling into question 
a fundamental framework proposition of classical logic, through argumentative ingenuity the 
dialetheist has facilitated debate by appealing to the classical logician’s other rational 
commitments. At base, the dialetheist proposes that the classical logician’s commitment to 
consistency is incompatible with these further rational commitments, forcing the classical 
logician to consider the viability of the LNC, which up to this point had been beyond doubt. 
We can see then that the dialetheist is able to provide rationally compelling reasons to the 
classical logician. The question now is, are classical logicians able to supply any reasons which 
are rationally compelling for the dialetheist in return? The answer is a resounding yes. 
As we have seen, while rejecting certain fundamental tenets of classical logic, dialetheists 
do commit themselves to rational standards in arguing for a dialetheic solution to the liar. 
Consequently, if one could show that dialetheic responses to the liar sentences were incomplete, 
ad hoc, or restricted expressiveness to a greater extent than a classical approach, this would 
constitute a serious challenge to the dialetheic research programme, and provide support for 
classical logic even in the eyes of the dialetheist. 
Further, dialetheists have been at pains to emphasise that in virtue of endorsing some 
contradictions as true, this in no way ensures they have given up other norms of rationality, 
such as proportioning one’s beliefs to the available evidence (Priest 2004). The dialetheist is 
                                                 
17 See, for example, Kirkham’s (1992, Ch. 9) criticisms of various non-dialetheic solutions along these 
lines. 
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not devoid of any guidelines for rationally evaluating theories just because she accepts certain 
contradictions as true. Indeed, the reason why she believes we ought to accept certain 
contradictions as true is because we have excellent reasons for doing so (Priest 2004). The 
dialetheist simply disagrees with the classical logician that consistency ought to be the golden 
benchmark for a theory (Priest 2006a, Ch. 7). Consequently, there are wider rational 
commitments that the dialetheist holds (Priest 2004, 2006a, Ch. 7): 
 
Non-triviality: Not every proposition is true. 
 
Non-absurdities: Our theories should not entail absurd consequences. 
 
Evidence: Our endorsement of any proposition should be motivated by evidence. 
 
These additional commitments ensure that one could undermine the dialetheist’s position by 
demonstrating it entailed an unsavoury consequence. While this unsavoury consequence might 
not be a contradiction per se, it may be a contradiction with a certain content which is 
independently absurd, or a non-contradictory absurdity that the dialetheist cannot stomach. 
Neither of these argumentative manoeuvres are precluded by the dialetheist’s endorsement of 
contradictions. 
Consequently, this opens up a second avenue with which the classical logician can provide 
the dialetheist with compelling reasons. In addition to providing a classical solution to the liar 
paradoxes which fit the defined criteria better than the dialetheic response, she can provide 
reasons for thinking that even if the dialetheic solution is better according to these criteria, its 
wider costs are just too high, based upon the recognised rational commitments above. To show 
that these avenues are available to the classical logician, let us give several examples from the 
literature. 
Firstly, it has been argued that dialetheic semantics are themselves expressively deficient. 
As was first recognised by Parsons (1990), the dialetheist cannot effectively disagree with 
another party’s espousal of p in the usual manner by expressing that ‘p is false’. After all, the 
fact that p is false for the dialetheist does not preclude p’s truth. Nor will it be enough for the 
dialetheist to say, ‘p is false and p isn’t true’, for p could also be true. Just like any other 
proposition, ‘p isn’t true’ could be both true and false, and thus a contradiction could arise. 
Consequently, the dialetheist will have to find another means to express disagreement, unless 
their theory is to be expressively deficient. 
That the dialetheist considers this expressive deficiency a rationally compelling criticism is 
not only demonstrated by the criteria she uses in criticising non-dialetheic solutions to the liar, 
but by the fact dialetheists feel the need to respond. Priest (2006a, Ch. 6) has attempted to 
remove this expressive deficiency by proposing that the dialetheist expresses disagreement not 
through her semantics, but rather with pragmatics. She disagrees with some claim p by denying 
that p, rather than asserting that p. After all, for the dialetheist, one could be fully committed 
to the truth of both p and p, and thus assert p while also asserting p. Consequently, the act 
of denying that p is in no sense identical to asserting that p for the dialetheist. Whereas an 
assertion of some proposition p communicates one’s acceptance of p (a mental act), the denial 
of p is a sui generis speech-act which communicates the rejection of p (another mental act). 
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Given that one cannot simultaneously accept and reject a claim, the denial of p properly 
excludes the assertion of p, and thus expresses disagreement with another’s assertion of p. 
This is not the end of the story though. While the dialetheist may be able to successfully 
communicate disagreement through pragmatics, the dialetheist’s inability to use her own 
semantics to preclude a proposition’s truth or falsity entails further problems, due to the 
existence of contexts in which denial cannot be successfully substituted for the semantic 
concept ‘false only’. To concentrate on an example from Shapiro (2004), one cannot transfer 
the speech-act denial into a conditional sentence, ‘If p isn’t true then consequences q1, q2…qn 
follow’. After all, force operators cannot be meaningfully embedded into truth-functional 
contexts. Thus, the introduction of pragmatics into the dialetheist’s communicative battery is 
simply a Band-Aid; the dialetheist’s semantics still suffers from being unable to suitably 
express that a proposition is ‘not both true and false’.  The problem of expressive deficiency 
raises its head again—according to her own commitments, the dialetheist must take seriously 
the need to find a means to preclude joint falsity and truth within her semantics. 
Yet, as other arguments (Littmann and Simmons 2004) have shown, once the dialetheist 
succeeds in forcing mutual exclusion between truth and falsity, allowing herself to express an 
exclusionary ‘false only’ within her semantics, this will cause concerns elsewhere. For this 
expressive power will automatically preclude her from providing a solution to certain revenge 
liars, such as: 
 
() ⌐¬ is false only. 
 
If a dialetheic solution is provided to (), then the sentence will turn out to be both true and 
false only, nullifying the exclusionary function of ‘false only’. Thus, it appears the dialetheist 
must choose between her semantics being expressively incomplete or her solution to the liar 
paradoxes being incomplete. Given that completeness in both areas are desiderata of the 
dialetheist’s theory, this is a rationally compelling criticism for the dialetheist. 
Lastly, away from the self-referential paradoxes, it has been shown that the dialetheist’s 
semantics commit her to the impossibility of the actual world (Martin 2015). Given the 
necessitation axiom and the fact that formulae of the form ¬(A  ¬A) are theorems of LP, it 
follows that the dialetheist is committed to ◻¬(A  ¬A), for any A, from which it follows that 
¬◇(A  ¬A), given the interdefinability of necessity and possibility. However, this just means 
that it’s impossible for contradictions to be true, and thus any world containing contradictions 
is impossible. Yet, according to the dialetheist, the actual world does contain true 
contradictions, and therefore is an impossible world. This is an unsavoury position for anyone, 
including the dialetheist. If any world fails to be impossible, it is the actual world, and the 
dialetheist has shown no inclination up to this point of doubting that (see Priest’s footnote in 
Lewis 2004). Here again, then, is another example in which the classical logician is able to offer 
rationally compelling reasons to the dialetheist based upon fundamental rational expectations. 
Both sides of the debate are able to supply one another with rationally compelling reasons. 
Rational debate is possible. Particularly, what we have presented is a deep disagreement in 
which, through ingenuity, both sides have been able to reframe the debate around commitments 
recognised by the other party despite some deep differences. Further, by digging deep enough 
into the parties’ fundamental commitments, certain rational norms are found to apply across the 
debate, such as respect for logical evidence (in the form of the liar paradoxes). As such, we 
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have a DD-WkP—a deep disagreement with a weak and partial clash of framework 
propositions—that is not principally immune to rational resolution. 
However, this example serves not only to show that a certain breed of deep disagreement, 
DD-WkP, is not immune to rational resolution. It also shows how easy it is to overestimate the 
extent of a clash of framework propositions. Just as Lewis suggested, when initially presented 
with dialetheism it would be natural to shrug one’s shoulders and ask what one could possibly 
say in reply. Yet, even in such drastic cases where important shared territory has been lost, there 
can be other commitments hiding in the background that, through argumentative effort and 
ingenuity, can be used to marshal reasons. We must ensure, when searching for deep 





This paper tasked itself with two objectives. Firstly, to clarify Fogelin’s thesis that deep 
disagreements are incapable of rational resolution. This it has achieved by way of distinguishing 
six breeds of such disagreements. Secondly, it has begun the much-neglected project of looking 
to real-life arguments in the search for deep disagreement, as Fogelin’s thesis requires. 
Particularly, we considered the debate between the dialetheist and classical logician over the 
truth of contradictions, and found that the debate constituted a DD-WkP in which rationally 
compelling reasons exist. The case suggests that even if parties disagree over important 
framework propositions, as long as there are some shared rational values, it is possible to 
reframe the debate around these values. 
Fogelin, then, was mistaken about at least one breed of deep disagreement. In order to test 
his claims for the other breeds, we must look again at real arguments. To support Fogelin’s 
claims, we must not only find examples of these breeds, but demonstrate that indeed the parties 
are incapable of supplying rationally compelling reasons. We may have higher hopes for those 
deep disagreements in which no framework propositions (including, rational values) are shared. 
Yet, as is apparent from our case here, we must be conscious when searching for these breeds 
of deep disagreements that finding common ground will often be hard-fought and only evident 
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